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ABSTRACT
Hardware security features need to strike a careful balance between design
intrusiveness and completeness of methods. Securing against attacks like Re-
turn Oriented Programming (ROP) requires frequent and expensive checks.
Complete security defenses have been proposed yet modern systems are still
vulnerable to ROP attacks. We provide complete security by decompos-
ing the solution into two stages. The rst stage raises alarms based on an
imprecise, low cost hardware detector. The second stage applies complete
methods in order to accurately distinguish real attacks from false alarms.
This decomposition is enabled with Record and Deterministic Replay. The
original execution is recorded and subjected to replay analysis as alarms are
raised. In this way the Replay infrastructure can compensate for the occa-
sional hardware imprecision.
We demonstrate this approach by applying it to thwart ROP attacks on
the Linux kernel. We call the design RnR-ROPSafe. It reuses a simple
Return Address Stack (RAS) as the hardware detector. The RAS is slightly
modied to prevent corruption of the RAS due to multithreading and due
to non-procedural returns|improving its performance as a ROP detector.
Rare false positives due to underows are eliminated via replay instead of
hardware over-design. RnR-ROPSafe relies on two on-the-y replayers: an
always-on, fast Checkpointing replayer that periodically creates checkpoints,
and a detailed-analysis Alarm replayer that is triggered when there is a threat
alarm. We nd that the rst one has execution speed comparable to that of
the recorder, and can be replaying all the time, while the latter has to handle
only very few false positives.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As security attacks are becoming more frequent and varied, there is increasing
interest in augmenting processor and system hardware with security features.
As a result, processor manufacturers have developed new hardware archi-
tectures, such as Intel's MPX [1], AMD's Secure Processor [2], and ARM
TrustZone technology [3].
A general diculty in this area is that security threats are continuously
evolving, circumventing existing security defenses. What used to be an eec-
tive defense yesterday is less eective today. For example, to defend against
code injection attacks, WX [2, 4] features have been widely deployed in
processors. They prevent the execution of data by enforcing the invariant
that memory pages are either executable or writable, but never both. As
a result, new attacks have appeared that do not need code injection. In
particular, an attack based on code reuse called Return Oriented Program-
ming (ROP) [5] is now the preferred technique. It builds attack code by
chaining together multiple snippets of code from the victim program, allow-
ing complete bypass of WX defenses. Systems today remain vulnerable to
such attacks despite the existence of provable prevention techniques [6, 7].
Such techniques cannot be implemented in modern systems either due to
prohibitive performance costs [6, 7] or unsatisable requirements [8, 9]. Less
expensive techniques have been proposed [10, 11, 12, 13, 14], but they can be
undermined due to the incompleteness of their methods [15,16,17,18,19].
An intriguing primitive that can be used to defend against security threats
is Record and Deterministic Replay (RnR) (e.g., [20, 21, 22]). With RnR,
a workload's initial execution creates a log, which can be deterministically
replayed on another machine. RnR has been used for security purposes,
most often o-line, to provide insight into how and when an attack took
place [20, 21]. It has also been used to support speculating past security
checks [22].
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In this thesis, we explore a novel approach to hardware security design
where RnR is used to complement a hardware security feature|to ooad
intrusive checks and/or to eliminate imprecision. Specically, security hard-
ware is allowed to be less precise at detecting attacks and potentially re-
port false positives; it relies on an on-the-y replayer to transparently verify
whether the alarm is a real attack or a false positive. This approach relies
on two types of on-the-y replayers: an always-on fast replayer that peri-
odically creates state checkpoints of the monitored execution (Checkpointing
replayer), and an analyzing replayer|triggered by an alarm|which starts
from a checkpoint and analyzes the execution to determine whether the alarm
indicated a real attack or was a false positive (Alarm replayer).
This thesis then applies this approach to thwart ROP attacks on the
kernel|a challenging target to defend. We call the design RnR-ROPSafe.
The micro-architecture that it builds on is the Return Address Stack (RAS).
A RAS misprediction occurs for benign software, making the RAS an impre-
cise ROP detector as is. Hence, RnR-ROPSafe makes simple modications
to the RAS hardware to eliminate the vast majority of the false positives.
The few remaining false positives are identied by the alarm replayer, thus
minimizing hardware changes.
To evaluate RnR-ROPSafe, we execute a set of varied workloads on a
Virtual Machine (VM) running Linux. We nd that the RnR-ROPSafe ar-
chitecture is an eective hardware-software co-design point. Thanks to the
judicious RAS hardware extensions and hypervisor changes, the checkpoint-
ing replayer has comparable execution speed to the recorder, and can be
replaying continuously. In addition, the alarm replayer has to handle only
very few false positives.
Assumed System and Threat Models. ROP attacks can occur within
the kernel or user contexts, and RepROP can secure both contexts. The
target most dicult to secure is the kernel. We focus on evaluating RepROP's
ability to detect kernel ROP attacks. The protected system (kernel and
applications) runs inside a VM whose execution is continuously recorded.
The recorded execution is then replayed, on a dierent platform, at which
point it is checked for ROP attacks.
We assume that the attacker can launch a ROP attack against the kernel.
We assume the host machine OS and hypervisor (recording and replaying
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machines) to be benign and that they can safeguard against compromised
guest VMs.
3
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Return Oriented Programming
The objective of attackers is to execute malware on a victim machine. In
the past, attackers injected malware machine code into memory allocated
for data. Later, execution is hijacked to fetch instructions that corrupted
memory. The WX [2, 4, 10, 23, 24] policy was designed to counter this spe-
cic attack vector. By enforcing that memory pages are either executable
or writable|but never both|malware injected into memory can no longer
be executed. To bypass WX, \Code Reuse" based attacks were proposed.
For these attacks, malware instructions are recovered from existing code in-
stead of injected into memory. Return Oriented Programing (ROP) [5] is the
dominating example of this approach.
Conceptually, an ROP attack executes multiple snippets of code from the
victim program or software environment (e.g. libc) called Gadgets. Each
gadget is terminated with a return|a branching instruction whose target is
popped from the software stack. The attacker rst loads into the software
stack the addresses of the desired gadgets. Then, to trigger the attack,
control ow is forced to the rst gadget. As the rst gadget terminates, its
return instruction pops the next entry from the software stack, redirecting
execution to the next gadget. Thus, by writing onto the stack the addresses
of gadgets, the attacker can stitch together a desired sequence of gadgets
required to achieve the desired malicious eects.
This type of attack is dangerous for several reasons. First, it has been
shown that the right set of gadgets can construct a Turing-complete lan-
guage [5] enabling an ROP compiler to translate malware from any other
Turing-complete language (like C) to one expressed entirely in gadgets. Sec-
ond, this attack bypasses the prevalent WX defense techniques, because
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there is no data being written and then directly executed: the malware ex-
ecutes existing code. Finally, any simple bug in the code enabling attackers
to corrupt the stack can trigger the execution of a sophisticated chain of
gadgets.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of an ROP attack that exploits a buer
overow to execute three gadgets. We use a buer overow bug for simplicity;
any bug that allows stack modication can be used to launch an ROP attack.
AA239C5FF0
BD905EE02F
23FF90BC78
9DD025FA72
DA9047FE85
28AA34FC28
BBD23FA931
04BCAD48F1
(a) Finding gadgets
G1
G2
G3
pop R1
ret
ret
call [R2]
ret
mov R2, [R1]
G2
G1
G3
(b) Translating to gadgets
pop R1
call [R2]
mov R2, [R1]
void vulnerable(char *str){
char buffer[128];
...
strcpy(buffer,str); /*No bounds check,
buffer overflow */...
return;
}
(c) Vulnerable code
Stack pointer
junk_data[0:127]
127
0
G1
G3
G2
Addr
St
ac
k 
gr
ow
th
(e) Functional stack (f) Compromised stack
Stack pointer
127
0
Return address
buffer[0:127]
(d) Generating a ROP chain
str = [junk_data[0:127], G1, Addr, G2, G3]
Figure 2.1: Example of Return Oriented Programming attack.
In Figure 2.1(a), the executable is scanned for instances of the return
(ret) instruction. We decode a few bytes before three returns creating three
gadgets (G1-G3). Executing the three gadgets in sequence is equivalent to
executing the code in Figure 2.1(b). The code will result in a subroutine call
to a function pointer loaded from a memory location stored on the stack. If
this was executed during kernel execution, this can be a call to code giving
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the user root privileges.
Figure 2.1(c) shows code that is vulnerable to a buer overow attack.
The code copies a string into a 128-byte buer without verifying that it can
t in the buer. Figure 2.1(d) shows how a payload can be constructed to
exploit this code to execute ROP malware. Figures 2.1(e-f) show the benign
state of the stack and its state after being corrupted by the malicious input
string. Now, returning from the vulnerable function takes us to G1, which
will pop Addr into R1 and then return. The return will lead to G2, which
will load into R2 and return to G3. Then G3 will perform the call.
ROP attacks can be detected with what is known as a Shadow Stack. The
shadow stack operates with typical \Last in First Out" semantics. Whenever
a call instruction is encountered, the address of the instruction following the
call is pushed to the top of the shadow stack. On the other hand, return in-
structions pop from the shadow stack. ROP attacks can be detected anytime
the return address used by the processor mismatches with the one popped
from the shadow stack.
Unmet challenges have prevented the utilization of shadow stacks in prac-
tice. First, the validity of this technique hinges on the integrity of the shadow
stack. Hence, it must be secured against the very software it protects|a non-
trivial task. Also, codes can be highly nested (e.g. recursive), multi-context
(e.g. kernel), or imperfectly nested (e.g. error/exception handling). Each of
these requires special handling.
2.2 ROP Still Possible on Current Systems
Many proposals focus on protection against ROP attacks [6, 7, 12, 13, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. However, these techniques remain unused. The reasons
are as follows.
HW Intrusiveness. Some solutions [26, 28, 30] require intrusive hardware
changes. SRAS [26] adds a secure hardware RAS to verify the return tar-
gets. System memory must back up the secure RAS, necessitating additional
read/write ports. The PUMP [30] processor implements support for general
metadata propagation. This can be used to implement various safety checks,
including Control Flow Integrity (CFI). However, each stage of the pipeline
must be changed to support tag storage and/or rule execution. REV [28]
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hashes the instruction sequences within a basic block to verify a program's
control ow. An additional 32KB rst-level cache dedicated for caching sig-
natures is required to avoid prohibitive slow-downs.
SW Impact. The completeness of instrumentation-based solutions such
as [6, 7] is attractive. However, securely maintaining the shadow RAS at
call/ret boundaries via binary instrumentation adds overheads that exceed
100% [7]. Other approaches [29, 33] propose recompiling the kernel and ap-
plication code to target a secure virtual instruction architecture. This ar-
chitecture is emulated by a compiler-based virtual machine (similar to the
Java Virtual Machine). Aside from the performance costs, source code is not
always available, which limits the applicability of this technique.
Completeness. Proposals looking for an alternative to CFI-based solutions
propose monitoring execution properties for indicators of ROP execution [12,
13]. However, benign programs may also trigger these detectors. Also, ROP
payloads can blend their signature to match that of benign code to evade
detection [17, 34]. Probabilistic defenses [11, 35, 36, 37] use a secret value to
encrypt or randomly arrange code/data. This signicantly complicates the
attacks, but other vulnerabilities [19] can leak secrets to negate the defenses.
2.3 Return Address Stack
Modern processors use a hardware structure called Return Address Stack
(RAS) to predict the target of return instructions. When a procedure call
instruction executes, the hardware pushes the address of the instruction that
follows it into the top of the RAS. When a return instruction is decoded,
the hardware pops the entry at the top of the RAS and uses its value as the
predicted target of the return. In most cases, the prediction is correct. The
IBM POWER7 [38] and POWER8 [39] processors have a RAS with 32 and
64 entries, respectively.
ROP attacks cause RAS mispredictions. Assume that the return from
gadget G1 to gadget G2 in the example was correctly predicted by the RAS.
This would require that a call was executed within gadget G2, so the ad-
dress of G2 gets placed on the RAS. However, G1 comes before G2. On
the other hand, a RAS misprediction cannot alone be used as an indicator of
ROP attacks because the RAS sometimes mispredicts in the course of benign
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program execution.
2.4 Record and Replay
Record and Replay (RnR) of workloads is a popular architectural technique
(e.g., [40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50]). As a workload runs, RnR records
all the non-deterministic events that can aect the execution and stores them
in a log. Later, in a potentially dierent platform, the workload is re-run.
At this time, the system injects the recorded events at the correct times, en-
forcing a deterministic execution (Replay). Typically, the non-deterministic
events are the inputs to the workload and, in parallel programs, the memory-
access interleaving.
RnR can be done at dierent abstraction layers. In this work, we use VM-
level RnR [20,41,42,51,52]. Moreover, we consider uniprocessor hardware. As
a result, the sources of non-determinism are interrupts raised and data copied
by virtual devices into the guest machine. We also assume the widely used
model of hypervisor-mediated I/O, as used in Xen [53] or Qemu [54]. These
assumptions are not necessarily limitations, as RnR approaches compatible
with multiprocessor [47] and virtualized I/O [55] exist.
There are several papers that investigate the use of RnR in a security-
related scenario [20,21,22,50,51,56]. ReVirt [20] shows an example of using
VM-level RnR for post-facto oine analysis of a time-of-check to time-of-use
race conditions in the Linux kernel. IntroVirt [21] explores using VM-level
RnR to determine if systems were previously exploited once zero-day attacks
are discovered. Speck [22] explores using a combination of OS-level specula-
tion and program-level RnR to remove security checks from the critical path
of a program. ParanoidAndroid [50] and Secloud [56] explore the possibility
of maintaining replicas of mobile devices in the cloud, and perform program-
level RnR in the cloud. Finally, Aftersight [51] suggests using VM-level RnR
to perform online dynamic analysis of a system's execution. However, it
does not address several important hardware-software design issues of such
a model, including a key contribution of our work: separation between the
fast checkpointing replayer and the exhaustive alarm replayer. We discuss
the details in Section 9.
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CHAPTER 3
RNR-ROPSAFE: THWARTING ROPS
We propose using a combination of existing processor hardware and well-
known RnR techniques to provide complete protection against ROP attacks
without the prohibitive costs of instrumentation-based approaches. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows the organization of our system, called RnR-ROPSafe. On the
left side, a workload runs on a Recorded VM. Its hypervisor records all the
non-deterministic events of the execution in a software log. Recording adds
only modest overhead|low enough for the execution not to be noticeably
slower. Note that we record at the VM level to also protect the operating
system.
Checkpointing
Replayer
Alarm
Replayer
Alarm
Replayer
Replaying VMs
Recording
Hypervisor
Checkpoints
Log
Inputs Alarms
Recorded VM
Figure 3.1: RnR-ROPSafe organization.
The designer has augmented the hardware in the recorded VM (e.g., pro-
cessor and memory system) with support to detect a certain class of attacks.
When the combined operation of this hardware and the recording hypervisor
detect the attack, the hypervisor inserts an alarm marker in the log. At this
point|and depending on the risk tolerance of the workload|the recorded
VM may be stopped until the alarm is analyzed, or allowed to continue.
On the right side, one or more Replaying VMs re-execute the workload
natively. They use the log to inject all the non-deterministic events. As a
result, their execution deterministically follows the original one.
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3.0.1 What Record and Replay Oers
The addition of RnR provides|in addition to its traditional usages|three
security benets.
Robustness. Perfect hardware detection accuracy often necessitates intru-
sive hardware. By separating alarm detection from attack verication using
RnR, this can be alleviated. Now, the only requirement for the hardware
security detectors is to support the common case. False alarms and rare cor-
ner cases are instead handled by software-based replay. Thus, RnR restores
robustness to a system stack that includes imprecise security hardware.
Flexibility. RnR is intrinsically exible. As attackers devise new attacks,
defenders can add new analysis techniques to the alarm replayer to detect
and/or prevent them. Defenders can even run parallel alarm replayers track-
ing dierent types of attacks at the same time. This is simplied because
the analysis is in software.
Execution Auditing. RnR allows detailed analysis of executions. The
execution context causing the alarm can be replayed to audit the code and
data state. This is a general mechanism for identifying security violations by
auditing sensitive ows in the system.
3.0.2 RnR-ROPSafe Modes of Execution
In RnR-ROPSafe, monitored recording consists of normal execution, while
transparently recording all the non-deterministic inputs in a log, and trans-
parently monitoring safety violations. If a violation is found or suspected,
an alarm entry is inserted in the log. A key detail is that, in order to claim
complete protection, the detector must catch all potential threats. In other
words, false negatives are impossible.
In RnR-ROPSafe, the replay execution can be performed in two ways.
One way is Checkpointing Replay. Such replay runs at recording-like speeds.
It uses the log to deterministically replay the workload while creating state
checkpoints at regular intervals. When an alarm marker is found in the log,
the checkpointing replayer launches the execution of an alarm replayer from
a recent (typically the latest is sucient) checkpoint. Once old checkpoints
and log entries are veried they can be discarded to save storage.
A second type of replay is Alarm Replay. Alarm replay replays log en-
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tries from a given checkpoint until an alarm, while performing an extensive,
attack-specic analysis of the replayed execution. Its goal is to resolve an
alarm, either to show that it is a false positive or to verify and characterize
the attack. It can be much slower than the recording execution.
Typically, alarms are rare events. Therefore, we envision one replaying VM
to continuously run the checkpointing replayer. This replayer simply replays
the workload at a speed comparable to the recorded execution, consuming
the log, and periodically creating state checkpoints. If the checkpointing
replayer nds an alarm marker in the log, it starts an alarm replayer in
another VM. The alarm replayer deterministically replays from the latest
checkpoint until it nds the alarm marker. This replay performs a detailed
analysis, characterizing the attack to identify the vulnerability it exploited
and to assess the extent of the damage.
This approach can be applied to protect against dierent attacks (Sec-
tion 6). In this thesis, we focus on ROP attacks.
In the next section, we explain the techniques of RnR-ROPSafe that im-
plement ROP protection exible enough to protect against ROP attacks [57]
on the kernel.
3.1 Main Idea in RnR-ROPSafe
The basic architecture primitive that can help detect ROPs is the RAS (Sec-
tion 2.3). The RAS stores the addresses of the predicted targets of return
instructions. At every call instruction, the hardware pushes the return ad-
dress onto the RAS; at every return, the hardware pops the RAS and uses
its address to predict the return target. Hence, a ROP attack causes RAS
mispredictions.
To use RAS mispredictions to prevent ROP attacks requires that there are
no false negatives. Fortunately, execution of ROP payloads is guaranteed to
cause RAS mispredictions, making false negatives impossible. Furthermore,
for this detector to be useful, false alarms should be infrequent. However,
there are a few major sources of imprecision in the basic RAS operation. We
will explain these sources with Linux kernel examples, where we found them
to be most common.
First, there is the eect of multithreading. In a multithreaded environ-
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ment, when the kernel switches from Thread i to Thread j, it leaves entries
belonging to Thread i on the RAS. When executing code in Thread j (or
other threads scheduled after i), these entries might be incorrectly popped
and used for prediction. If so, not only will Thread j encounter mispredic-
tions, but also Thread i's entries will no longer be available for their use after
i is rescheduled. Hence, there will be mispredictions and false positive ROP
alarms.
A second eect is non-procedural returns in the kernel. Sometimes|e.g.,
during a context switch|the kernel inserts an address into the software stack,
which will later be used by a return instruction as target. Since there was no
prior call from that address, the RAS will not contain a corresponding entry
and will mispredict.
RAS underows are a third source of imprecision. If the code executes
many nested procedure calls, the RAS may evict some of the earlier return
addresses. Later, when the execution returns from the inner calls and tries
to pop entries corresponding to the outer calls, the RAS will be empty (un-
derow) and will mispredict.
Imperfect nesting in procedure calls is another reason for RAS mispredictions|
a situation where a procedure is called but never returned from. Within the
kernel, these are rare events that typically only take place as part of bug
recovery processes in the kernel. When the kernel execution encounters a
recoverable bug, it initiates a recovery process, as part of which it terminates
the current thread of execution, leaving all the RAS entries of the current
thread orphaned. For user-mode code these occur more commonly|for ex-
ample, exception handling is implemented using setjmp/longjmp.
These eects show that the RAS is an imprecise detector of ROPs and,
therefore, unusable as is. For RnR-ROPSafe to use it as the initial indica-
tor, two steps are needed. First, we robustify the RAS detection capability
with simple hardware and hypervisor support. The goal is to minimize the
false positive rate. To completely eliminate false positives requires disruptive
software changes and intrusive hardware changes. The second step is to use
deterministic replay to distinguish the false alarms from the real attacks|
and to characterize any detected ROPs.
An alarm replayer is invoked when there is an alarm. Since it has to
provide a response quickly, replay cannot start from the beginning of the
VM execution. Instead, it starts from a nearby checkpoint created by the
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checkpointing replayer.
In the following, we describe the components of RnR-ROPSafe and the
steps taken to protect the kernel despite its unique RAS challenges.
3.2 Basic Design
As shown in Figure 3.1, the workload (applications + kernel) runs in a
Recorded VM. As it runs, the hypervisor creates an input log that is sent
to and consumed by a Replaying VM.
The traditional behavior of the RAS is slightly augmented in this basic
design of RnR-ROPSafe. Specically, if we are executing a return instruc-
tion in kernel mode, and a mismatch is found between the predicted target
in the RAS and the actual return target, the hardware sets a ag (called
ROP Alarm) in the ROB entry for the return instruction. When a return
reaches the ROB head, if the ROP Alarm bit is set, a VM exit is triggered.
Then, the hypervisor inserts a ROP alarm entry in the input log. Depending
on its conguration, the hypervisor may or may not stop the recorded VM
until the alarm is fully processed in the replaying VM.
In the meantime, the checkpointing replayer is consuming the log to create
regular checkpoints. If it nds the alarm entry in the log, it triggers the
execution of the alarm replayer, starting from the most recent checkpoint.
The alarm replayer determines whether it is a false alarm or a real ROP. It
is possible|but rare|that an older checkpoint is needed to conrm/refute
the attack.
This basic RnR-ROPSafe design will not miss an attack, since a ROP has to
execute a return instruction. However, this is insucient, as a large source
of false alarms remains: those due to multithreading and non-procedural
returns. Alarms involve costly VM exits and lengthy replay, incurring high
overheads with this design. Next, we extend this basic design to reduce its
false positives.
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3.3 Supporting a Multithreaded Environment
In a multithreaded environment, a thread might be de-scheduled|e.g., due
to pre-emption or performing a blocking operation|while executing in kernel
mode. The return address entries left by this thread on the RAS might be
popped and used (incorrectly) by subsequent threads, and this thread itself
might pop and use RAS entries belonging to other threads once it is re-
scheduled. The result is RAS mispredictions and a large source of false ROP
alarms.
To address this problem, RnR-ROPSafe extends the processor hardware.
On a context switch, the hardware automatically saves the current RAS into
a safe memory area, and restores the RAS state as needed for the upcoming
running thread. The hypervisor helps by setting a hardware pointer to point
to the correct memory area to move data out and in. For that, we augment
the set of structures that the micro-coded virtualization hardware already
saves and restores at the context switch to also include the RAS.
The structures are shown in Figure 3.2. The software structure in memory
is an array of backed-up RASes (BackRAS). Each entry belongs to a thread,
and has a RAS and a counter with the number of entries in the RAS. The
counter is needed to know the number of entries that need to be read later
on. The processor hardware includes a pointer (BackRASptr) that points
to the backed-up RAS of the currently running thread. The pointer is set
by the hypervisor and used by the hardware to access the correct BackRAS
entry.
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Figure 3.2: Structures used to support multiple threads.
The logic used is shown in Figure 3.3. On a context switch, as part of
the transition to the hypervisor, the hardware saves the RAS to the entry to
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which BackRASptr is pointing. In addition, it computes and stores the count
of saved entries. Our measurements show that a transition to the hypervisor
already takes about 1,000 cycles. We estimate that backing up the RAS
will add about 20% more time. Later, when the hypervisor runs, it changes
BackRASptr to point to the entry for the new thread. Finally, as part of the
transition back to the guest, the hardware reads the correct BackRAS entry
into the RAS. We also estimate about 20% additional overhead.
To program the BackRASptr, the hypervisor needs to be informed of con-
text switches in the guest kernel and identify the new thread to be scheduled.
Section 4.2 explains how this can be done without modifying the guest kernel.
to Thread j
from Thread i
Context switch
HW transition HW transitionGuest
Save RAS toThread i
BackRAS[i]runs
Set BackRASptr
to point to
BackRAS[j]
BackRAS[j]
to RAS
Copy Thread j
runs
GuestHypervisor
Time
Figure 3.3: Algorithm and timeline to handle multiple threads.
With this support, when a thread is scheduled, it will nd its correct state
in the RAS, thus eliminating many false alarms.
3.4 Supporting Non-Procedural Returns
Sometimes, the kernel uses the return instruction as an indirect branch.
Specically, it inserts an address into the software stack, and then executes
a return that uses that address as target. Since there was no corresponding
procedure call, the RAS did not push an entry, and will mispredict. Conse-
quently, in these cases, the RAS should not be popped, as doing so would
corrupt the RAS state.
In the Linux version we use, this use of returns outside of the procedural
abstraction occurs once, when a context switch is complete. At that point,
right before launching the next thread, the kernel executes such a return in
order to start executing code on behalf of the new thread. This code is written
in assembly and directs the control ow to a few well-dened locations in the
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kernel code. These locations complete the task switching based on whether
it involves forking a thread, executing a kernel thread, or rescheduling a task.
To address this problem, RnR-ROPSafe extends the processor hardware
with a table of \whitelisted" addresses. For our Linux version, there is a
single-entry return whitelist (RetWhitelist) with the PC of the single return
used as indirect branch, and a target whitelist (TarWhitelist) with the PC
of the three instructions that can be the target of this return. During return
address prediction, if a return and its target PC match entries in the tables,
then the RAS is not popped and no alarm is raised. The potential for these
lists to bypass our security checks is limited as they are only writable by the
hypervisor.
The logic used and its timeline are shown in Figure 3.4. When an instruc-
tion is decoded and identied as a return, the hardware checks if its PC is in
the RetWhitelist. If so, the RAS is not popped and a Whitelisted ag in the
return's ROB entry is set. Later, when the target address is accessed, if the
Whitelisted ag is set, the hardware checks if its PC is in the TarWhitelist.
If it is not, the ROP Alarm bit is set in the ROB entry for the return in-
struction. When the return reaches the ROB head, if the ROP Alarm bit is
set, a VM exit is triggered.
Raise ROP alarm
}
Return at ROB head
If (ROP_Alarm==1){
Time
Don’t pop RAS
Whitelisted=1}
Return decoded
If (PC in RetWhitelist){ If (Whitelisted==1){
If(Target not in
TarWhitelist){
ROP_Alarm=1}}
Target address accessed
Figure 3.4: Timeline to handle non-procedural returns.
The whitelisted addresses can be found by analyzing the binary image of
the guest kernel. Then, the hypervisor can populate RetWhiteList and Tar-
WhiteList using the identied addresses when entering the VM as explained
in Section 4.1.
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3.5 RAS Underows and Imperfect Nesting
It is possible that the kernel executes many nested procedure calls, causing
the RAS to evict some of the earlier return addresses. In this case, when
the hardware accesses the RAS in a return instruction, it may nd it empty.
This will cause a RAS misprediction, and will trigger a ROP alarm when the
return instruction reaches the ROB head. These alarms are likely to be false
positives.
RnR-ROPSafe could prevent this problem by adding more entries in the
RAS or opportunistically saving/restoring the RAS. However, this requires
expensive hardware that is rarely used. Hence, RnR-ROPSafe lets these
events raise ROP alarms, and relies on the replayer to identify them as false
positives. Since the replayer models an unbounded RAS, it has no underows
and can lter out such false positives.
Similarly, we let the processor raise ROP alarms for mispredictions due to
imperfect nesting. Such alarms are easily ltered out by our alarm replayer.
It should be noted that these events are very rare|we encountered only a
few underows in our benchmark runs.
3.6 Replaying Platform
The input log is passed to another platform, where the VM execution is de-
terministically replayed in one or several guest VMs. At all times, there is
at least one VM running the checkpointing replayer. In addition, at certain
times, there may be one or more VMs running alarm replayers. As indicated
above, the checkpointing replayer consumes the log as it is received, and
creates checkpoints at regular intervals. When it nds a ROP alarm marker
in the input log, it initiates an alarm replayer at the immediately preced-
ing checkpoint. The alarm replayer carefully analyzes the execution until it
reaches the alarm marker, to determine if it is a true ROP or a false alarm.
3.6.1 Checkpointing Replayer
To understand the operation of the checkpointing replayer (CR), we rst de-
scribe the contents of a checkpoint. Figure 3.5 shows three checkpoints. Each
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checkpoint has three components. The rst one is all the pages with the VM
state. These include the memory pages plus a page with the processor state
(PC, stack pointer, and the rest of the registers at the time of checkpoint).
They also include the virtual disk image contents. This is the state that
the VM being recorded wrote to the virtual disk. We need to checkpoint
it because, if the execution later reads this data, the data will not appear
in the input log. Note, however, that the state checkpoints are incremental.
Since we take regular checkpoints, a given checkpoint keeps copies of only
the pages that have been modied since the previous checkpoint; for each
unmodied page, it keeps a pointer to the page in the latest checkpoint that
modied it.
 
 


Pages and
blocks of
program
state
BackRAS
Checkpt 1 Checkpt 3Checkpt 2
InputLogPtr
Input log buffer
Time
Figure 3.5: Checkpoints created by the checkpointing replayer.
The second component of a checkpoint is a pointer to the input log buer
(InputLogPtr). The pointer points to the next input log entry to be processed
after the checkpoint. Finally, the last component is the BackRAS at the time
of the checkpoint. We will see in Section 3.6.2 that the alarm replayer needs
this state.
The processor hardware on which the CR runs operates slightly dierently
than how it operated for the recorded VM|in order for the hardware to help
create the checkpoints. Specically, the hardware dumps the RAS into the
BackRAS not just at context switching points, but also at every VM exit
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while in the kernel. This ensures that, at the point of the checkpoint (which
is also a VM exit), the CR has the up-to-date state of the BackRAS to stash
in the checkpoint. There is no restoring of the RAS at non-context switching
VM exits. As indicated in Section 3.3, we estimate a VM exit and subsequent
entry to take  2,000 cycles, and saving the RAS to be  10% of it.
A second modication is that the processor hardware's ability to trigger
ROP alarms is disabled. This is because replay does not create alarms.
With this background, we now describe the CR operation. The CR ex-
ecutes the recorded VM, in a deterministic manner, while consuming the
input log. After every checkpoint, all the pages comprising the VM's mem-
ory and disk state are marked as copy-on-write. When a page is modied for
the rst time since the last checkpoint, a copy is made and used from now
on. When the CR decides to create a checkpoint, it interrupts the proces-
sor and dumps the processor state (PC, stack pointer, and all registers) into
a memory page. The RAS is automatically saved as part of the VM exit.
The CR then creates the checkpoint by saving: (1) all the modied memory
pages and disk blocks, together with pointers to the unmodied ones, (2) the
current BackRAS, and (3) the current InputLogPtr. Then, the CR restores
the processor state, marks all pages copy-on-write, and continues execution.
The CR regularly recycles checkpoints. However, it can only recycle a
memory page or disk block if it is not pointed to by a later checkpoint.
3.6.2 Alarm Replayer
The goal of the alarm replayer (AR) is to determine whether an alarm is
caused by a ROP or if it is a false alarm. If the former, the AR immediately
provides the state of the processor, memory, and disk at the point of the
ROP attack.
The processor hardware on which the AR runs neither dumps the RAS
state nor triggers ROP alarms. Both capabilities are disabled because they
are not needed.
The AR VM starts its execution by initializing the VM state using a check-
point. It marks all the pages pointed to by the checkpoint as copy-on-write to
avoid modifying the initial state. Then, it reads the checkpoint's BackRAS
into its own software data structure that it uses to simulate the RAS. Next, it
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loads the processor state from memory into the processor registers. Finally,
it starts execution, reading from the log starting from the InputLogPtr.
The AR executes the recorded VM natively, in a deterministic manner,
consuming the input log until it reaches the alarm marker. The AR models
unbounded, per-thread RAS structures in software. As such, the AR traps
every call and return instruction, inducing VM exits and transferring control
to the hypervisor. Then, the hypervisor runs in software the basic RnR-
ROPSafe algorithm plus its extensions for multithreading and non-procedural
returns. The simulated RAS cannot underow as it is unbounded.
Once the AR encounters the alarm in the log, it checks whether the RAS
mismatch can only be explained as an ROP attack. If so, an expert can
carefully study the execution state| by performing multiple replays with in-
creasingly targeted instrumentation|to glean information about the attack.
Chapter 5 shows an example. Note that this design readily accommodates
running multiple ARs to analyze multiple ROP alarms in parallel.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Following Intel's VT terminology, we use VMCS (VM Control Structure) to
refer to the in-memory control structure through which the hypervisor com-
municates with and congures the virtualization hardware. We use VMEnter
to mean transferring execution from the hypervisor to the VM, and VMExit
to mean the opposite transfer.
4.1 Hardware Implementation of RnR-ROPSafe
The hardware changes required to implement RnR-ROPSafe are minimal.
First, we need to allow the hypervisor to program the contents of Back-
RASPtr, RetWhiteList and TarWhiteList. This can be done by extending
the VMCS with three new elds. The microcoded logic of VMEnter reads
these elds to program these three processor hardware structures. In addi-
tion, it uses the BackRAS entry pointed to by BackRASPtr to populate the
RAS. Similarly, on a VMExit, its microcoded logic dumps the RAS content
into the active BackRAS entry.
The second set of hardware changes has to do with the interaction between
the RAS hardware and in-window speculation. In a conventional processor,
RAS entries can be pushed and popped by speculative call and return in-
structions that may be squashed later|e.g., due to a branch misprediction or
an exception in upstream instructions. However, when our hardware dumps
the RAS content on a VMExit, we need to dump only those entries that cor-
respond to architecturally retired instructions. This requires the following
changes.
In conventional processors, the RAS is typically implemented as a circular
buer with a single pointer, Top, pointing to the most recent entry. Call
instructions increment this pointer and write to the top entry (push); re-
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turn instructions read from the top entry (pop) and decrement this pointer.
Both instructions typically modify the RAS while still speculative (i.e., be-
fore reaching the ROB head). In RnR-ROPSafe, we augment this design
by adding two more pointers, NonSpec Top and NonSpec Bottom, which re-
spectively point to the youngest and oldest RAS entries that correspond to
architecturally retired (non-speculative) instructions. Then, on a VMExit,
the hardware only dumps the RAS entries between these two pointers.
In our design, the RAS continues to use the Top pointer for its normal push
and pop operations and for making predictions. NonSpec Top is incremented
(decremented) by the retirement of call (return) instructions. Therefore, it al-
ways points to the architecturally accurate top of the RAS. NonSpec Bottom
is used to deal with the cases where a call instruction, which is later squashed,
pushes to an already full RAS and overwrites an older, non-speculative RAS
entry. Such overwriting can only happen when the RAS is full and, with a
big-enough RAS, will be a rare event. To avoid having to recover the lost
RAS entry, we increment NonSpec Bottom when the entry that it points to is
overwritten by a RAS push. This way, the net eect of overwriting the RAS
entry will be an underow (when the return corresponding to the overwrit-
ten entry is executed), instead of polluting the RAS dump with speculative
content.
4.2 Hypervisor and RAS Hardware Interaction
In this section, we explain how the hypervisor is modied to use the hardware
extensions of RnR-ROPSafe.
Programming BackRASPtr on a Context Switch
In RnR-ROPSafe, the hypervisor needs to interpose on all context switches
in the guest kernel during both recording and replay. In Linux, there is a
single instruction where the stack pointer is changed from pointing to the
current thread's stack to the next thread's stack. By setting a trap on this
instruction, the hypervisor forces a VMExit when the guest executes this
instruction. As part of the VMExit's microcoded logic, the hardware dumps
the RAS into the memory location pointed to by BackRASPtr.
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Once the VMExit is complete and the control is transferred to the hyper-
visor, it can use a technique known as VM introspection to inspect the state
of the guest OS. This allows the hypervisor to identify the next thread to be
scheduled. In Linux, a thread's descriptor (called task struct) can be easily
found if the thread's stack pointer is known. Since we set the trap on the
instruction that changes the processor's stack pointer, we can nd the next
thread's stack pointer by examining the register content of the VM, which
is available in the VMCS after a VMExit. Using this stack pointer, we nd
the corresponding task struct descriptor in the VM's memory, and from that
descriptor, read the next thread's ID.
The hypervisor stores the BackRAS in a memory area inaccessible to the
guest machine. It stores it as a hash table mapping a thread's ID (\key")
to its BackRAS entry (\value"). Using this organization, once the thread
ID is found, the hypervisor checks the map to determine if there is already
an entry for that thread. If not, it means that the next thread is executing
for the rst time, and the hypervisor allocates a new entry for it. In either
case, the hypervisor sets the BackRASPtr eld of the VMCS to point to the
BackRAS entry.
4.2.1 Recycling BackRAS Entries
In Linux, threads are constantly being created and killed, and their IDs
may be reused. To keep the BackRAS consistent, we need to remove from
the BackRAS a thread's entry when the thread is killed and its ID can be
reused. Similarly to the case of context switching, the hypervisor sets a trap
on the function that implements this functionality in the guest kernel to force
a VMExit when it is executed. At that point, the thread ID can be found
by introspection and then used to delete the corresponding BackRAS entry.
4.3 Complexity Discussion
One of the primary motivations for our work is nding a solution that is
largely compatible with commodity systems and ensures detection of ROP
payloads. The need for strong guarantees necessitates ne-grained CFI [6]
and not probabilistic measures [11, 35]|without prohibitive costs. It is also
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important that our solution suer neither the overheads of instrumentation-
based approaches [7] nor the intrusiveness of hardware-based approaches [25,
26,28].
As discussed in Section 3.1, most of our hardware for verifying return in-
struction targets reuses the existing hardware RAS along with its read/write
ports. The actual hardware added by RnR-ROPSafe includes: the two
whitelist tables, a bit per ROB entry to mark an alarm, the BackRASptr
register, and two pointers in the RAS. The maintenance of the BackRAS
array in Figure 3.2 is performed in microcode, as the processor executes VM
entries and exits. The requirement for RnR can be considered the most sub-
stantial change. However, RnR is well understood and accepted as a useful
primitive for debugging and program analysis [21,22,51,58].
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATION FOR KERNEL ROP
DETECTION
We built and ran the ROP attack of Figure 2.1. In the recording VM, as the
workload calls the vulnerable procedure of Figure 2.1(c), the hardware pushes
into the RAS the address of the instruction at the call site (call it CallSite).
This is the same address that is stored next to the buer in the software
stack of Figure 2.1(e). After the malicious string copy, the software stack
becomes Figure 2.1(f). As the program executes the return of the vulnerable
procedure, the hardware uses the RAS to predict that execution will transfer
to CallSite. In reality, the target of the return is resolved to be the address
of gadget G1, as shown in Figure 2.1(f). This mismatch causes the recorded
VM to raise an alarm.
The recorded VM hypervisor then inserts an alarm marker in the log and
may decide to stall the VM. When the checkpointing replayer sees the alarm
marker in the log, it starts an alarm replayer from the most recent checkpoint.
As the alarm replayer executes, it models the RAS in software. At the point
of the alarm, it observes the mismatch between the return's predicted target
(in the RAS) and the actual target (in the software stack), hence declaring
a ROP attack.
At this point, the hypervisor performs an analysis of the system. It can
use VM introspection to analyze the VM state, which has not been polluted
by the execution of any gadget. It can also invoke additional replays farther
back in time to perform a deeper analysis of the system.
One question replay analysis can answer is: how was the attack possible
to begin with? The hypervisor uses the return instruction that caused the
alarm to determine that the attack occurred in the vulnerable procedure. It
uses the address at the top of the RAS to determine the call site. An analysis
of the vulnerable procedure can conclude the presence of buer overow. An-
other question is who attacked the machine? The hypervisor can determine
the thread ID of the current thread, extract which users are logged in, and
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determine which network connections are established. Yet another question
is: what did the attacker do? An analysis of the software stack can reveal
the gadgets used by the attacker. In this case, they did not execute. If
they did, the hypervisor can use VM introspection to analyze what les were
touched, what sockets were utilized, and what processes were forked [59].
This information is easy to get now because the workload is not running.
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE EXTENSIONS
The RnR primitive we utilize can empower other security defenses. The
key advantage is that the replay can be used to compensate for imprecise
rst lines of defense. The replay can distinguish the false alarms by using
additional information or complete methods.
For example, Table 6.1 considers jump-oriented programming (JOP) [60]
and denial of service (DOS) [61]. The table shows the alarm trigger, the
hardware needed, and the role of RnR. For example, JOPs can be detected
with a hardware table of addresses of the most common functions. An in-
direct branch target is compared to the table and is legal if the target is
the rst instruction of a function, or any target within the current func-
tion. Otherwise, an alarm is triggered, and the RnR will check against all
the remaining functions. A DOS attack on the OS can be detected with a
counter that increments every time the kernel performs a context switch. If
the counter has not increased much for a while, an alarm is triggered, and
the RnR analyzes and identies the code that has dominated the system's
execution time.
Table 6.1: Potential uses of the RnR based approach.
Attack Alarm Hardware Needed Role of RnR
Trigger
Kernel ROP RAS mis- Dump the RAS, Perform kernel-
prediction BackRASPtr, compatible shadow
Whitelist stack algorithm
Jump Stray Table of addresses Verify control ow
Oriented indirect of most common integrity of calls
Program- branch functions (entry to less common
ming (JOP) and end addresses) functions
Denial of Kernel Counter of number Identify reason for
Service scheduler of context switches low switching
(DOS) inactivity frequency
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To evaluate RnR-ROPSafe, we use two evaluation environments. The rst
one evaluates the performance of our recording and replaying modes. For
this, we use Insight [62], a VM RnR tool based on a modied Linux KVM
hypervisor and QEMU devices. Since the KVM hypervisor can leverage Intel
VTx extensions to virtualize the processor in hardware, the performance
numbers from this setup are representative of real-world machines.
The second environment evaluates the correctness of our techniques and
the functional characteristics of our proposed hardware. For this, we use
QEMU in emulation mode. In this mode, QEMU also emulates the processor
using dynamic translation of the systems software. This mode makes it easy
to simulate our hardware and evaluate its function.
Table 7.1 shows the system conguration we used for our performance
evaluation, and Table 7.2 shows our benchmarks.
Table 7.1: System conguration for performance evaluation.
Host machine
CPU: Xeon E3-64bit,4-cores,3.1GHz Memory: 8 Gbytes
OS: Ubuntu, Linux kernel 2.6.38-rc8
Guest machine
CPU: uniprocessor Memory: 1 Gbyte
OS: Debian, Linux kernel 3.19.0 Disk: 32 Gbytes
Table 7.2: Benchmarks executed.
Benchmark Parameters
apache -n100000 -c20
2*leio {le-total-size=6G {le-test-mode=rndrw
{le-extra-ags=direct {max-requests=10000
make linux-4.0 cong with all-no
2*mysql -test=oltp -oltp-test-mode=simple
-max-requests=500000 -table-size=4000000
radiosity -p1 -bf 0.005 -batch -largeroom
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7.1 Handling Non-Deterministic (ND) Events
The log contains three kinds of ND events. Here we describe the types of
ND events and how they are recorded and replayed.
Synchronous ND Events. Instructions such as rdtsc (read time stamp
counter) or rdrand (read random number generator) return ND results. Ac-
cesses to memory regions like Memory Mapped IO (MMIO) are also ND. The
VMCS controls when the processor will perform a VMExit. We congure the
controls to synchronously trap these ND accesses, allowing the hypervisor to
log their results. With similar conguration of the controls on the replaying
system, these events are deterministically reproduced during replay.
Network inputs are a special case and are also synchronous in our system.
The arrival of network packets to the physical NIC is inherently asynchronous
but the data is delivered to the VM at the boundaries of synchronous VMEx-
its. Thus, this simplies the recording and replaying of network events.
Synchronous ND Events. Instructions such as rdtsc (read time stamp
counter) or rdrand (read random number generator) return ND results. Ac-
cesses to memory regions like Memory Mapped IO (MMIO) are also ND.
The VMCS controls when the processor will perform a VMExit. We lever-
age this fact to trap these ND accesses, allowing the hypervisor to log their
ND results. These VMExits are deterministically reproduced during replay.
The replay time VMExits can be associated with the corresponding VMExits
from the recorded execution if a synchronous VMExit count is maintained
during record. Delivering the inputs during these VMExits will faithfully
replay them.
Network. ND inputs from network trac can constitute signicant portions
of the input log. Network trac addressed to the VM arrives as packets
through the host machine's physical NIC and are subsequently delivered to
the appropriate VM virtual NIC by the QEMU IO thread. The ND packet
contents and the point where the data is injected into the virtual NIC must
be logged in the input log. The injection into the virtual NIC occurs at
boundaries of synchronous VMExits. Therefore, as before, the synchronous
VMExit number is enough to enable faithful replay.
Asynchronous ND Events. Asynchronous events are more challenging to
replay. These events are due to external (to the processor) interrupts. Exam-
ples include inter-processor interrupts and interrupts from physical devices
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like disks.
The VMCS can be congured to cause these events to trigger asynchronous
VMExits. Since these VMExits are asynchronous, they will not naturally
occur during replay. Faithful replay requires that these events be delivered
at the same point where they originally occurred. Therefore, we are forced
to recreate them manually.
Replicating these VMExits is not straightforward. Insight uses perfor-
mance counters to cause a VMExit close to where there needs to be one.
Then, we perform one VMExit per instruction, single-stepping until execu-
tion reaches the injection point. Each VMExit costs about 2,000 cycles.
Asynchronous ND Events. Asynchronous events are more challenging to
replay. These occur from external interrupts. These interrupts originate from
other processors or from physical devices like disks. The VMCS structure
can also be congured to cause a VMExit on these events. These VMExits,
however, are asynchronous and will not repeat on the same instruction during
replay. Therefore, for faithful replay, replay has to manually recreate them.
Trapping the VM at the same processor context is not straightforward.
Insight uses performance counters to cause a VMExit as close as possible
to the required point in replay. From there, the processor is single-stepped
until execution reaches the desired injection point. Each step will suer the
overhead of a VMExit (2,000 cycles).
7.2 Evaluating Replay Overhead
To evaluate the overhead of checkpointing replay, we reuse the Linux copy-
on-write implementation used during fork system calls. Virtual memory
belonging to the VM is allocated within a user-space QEMU process running
on the host machine. With minor modications, a checkpoint can be created
by forking the QEMU process.
The alarm replayer models the RAS at every call and return instruction.
Unfortunately, current Intel VTx extensions do not support trapping call and
return instructions. Hence, to measure the performance impact of alarm re-
play, we modied GCC to instrument binaries by inserting a debug exception
before kernel context switches, and before call and return instructions. The
debug exception is a single byte opcode (0xCC) used to trap instructions by
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raising debug exceptions. The VMCS is congured to cause VMExits on de-
bug exceptions. This allows us to mimic the behavior of the alarm replayer,
modulo a minor performance impact due to a 0.11% increase in the size of
the Linux binary.
7.3 Evaluating the Proposed Hardware
In binary translation mode, QEMU virtualizes the processor using software
only. This mode is signicantly slower, but it allows for simulation of hard-
ware. We use this mode to evaluate our proposed hardware modications in
RnR-ROPSafe. We simulate a 48-entry RAS by default.
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CHAPTER 8
EVALUATION
8.1 Recording
Our recording scheme generates the log and also saves/restores the RAS at
context switches. Recall we require hypervisor-mediated I/O, which prevents
the use of para-virtualized network drivers (PV). We call the scheme Rec.
Figure 8.1(a) compares Rec's execution time to three other setups: no record-
ing with PV drivers (NoRecPV), no recording and no PV drivers (NoRec),
and recording without dumping the RAS (RecNoRAS). Each benchmark is
normalized to NoRec.
We see that disabling PV increases the execution time of these benchmarks
by 25-150%. As previously mentioned, RnR has been successfully applied to
PV drivers [55]; applying those techniques in our solution would eliminate
this overhead from our system. Apache and leio are aected the most, while
mysql is not impacted much as it avoids disk accesses by caching recently
accessed tables in memory.
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Figure 8.1: Execution time of recording setups (a) and breakdown of the
Rec overhead over NoRecNoPV (b).
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Recording (Rec) takes, on average, 32% longer than NoRec. Record-
ing without saving/restoring the RAS (RecNoRAS) takes 28% longer than
NoRec. These overheads are modest. To understand their source, Fig-
ure 8.1(b) shows again the slowdown of Rec over NoRec and breaks it down
into their sources, namely recording timer reads (rdtsc), port and memory-
mapped I/O accesses (pio/mmio), interrupts, network packet contents, and
saving/restoring the RAS.
We see that the dominant overhead across all benchmarks is due to record-
ing rdtsc. This event occurs very frequently, especially in leio and mysql,
where the application itself issues many timer reads to measure transaction
speed. In addition, leio issues disk command and control signals using pio.
It also has DMA activity, which causes interrupt events to signal le access
completion. Apache receives network packets and uses mmio accesses to the
NIC to retrieve the packets. The more computation-intensive benchmarks
(make and radiosity) have little overhead. Finally, saving/restoring the RAS
induces only 4% overhead on average.
Figures 8.2(a) and (b) show the input log generation rate, and the band-
width of RAS saving and restoring, respectively, for all our benchmarks. We
do not compress the data. We see that the rates are low. Apache has the
highest input log rate (4 MB/s) because it records network packet contents.
RAS save/restore bandwidth is very small.
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Figure 8.2: Input log generation rate (a) and bandwidth to save/restore the
RAS (b).
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8.2 Minimizing False Alarms
The RnR-ROPSafe hardware eliminates most of the false alarms in the kernel,
allowing only a few false alarms (in our case due to RAS underow) to
be reported to the replayers. Figure 8.3 shows the number of kernel false
alarms reported to the replayers (FalseAlarm) and those suppressed with the
whitelist and with the BackRAS. The gure shows the number per million
instructions. Since the number of remaining false alarms is so small, the
FalseAlarm category cannot be seen, and we put the number on top of the
bars. All the benchmarks except Apache have practically no kernel false
alarm. Apache has a few false alarms because it has some deep procedure
nesting under network stress conditions. Both the whitelist and the BackRAS
are very eective at removing false alarms.
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Figure 8.3: Kernel alarms and alarms suppressed.
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Figure 8.4: Execution time of checkpointing replay setups (a) and
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8.3 Replaying
8.3.1 Checkpointing Replay
Figure 8.4(a) compares the execution time of various checkpointing replay
setups to the recording setup (Rec). The replay setups use no checkpointing
(RepNoChk) or checkpoint every 5, 1, or 0.2 seconds (RepChk5, RepChk1, and
RepChk02, respectively). The bars are normalized to Rec. From the data,
we see that checkpointing every 1 second (RepChk1) increases the execution
time over Rec by 59% on average.
These results show that checkpointing replay runs at a speed that is
roughly comparable to that of recording. As a result, checkpointing replay
can be on all the time. While checkpointing replay is a bit slower, it can
catch up with recording because busy machines are rarely 100% utilized |
they are often waiting for multiple reasons. During that time, recording slows
down but replay can continue. If the replay gets signicantly behind, we can
use backpressure to temporarily slow down recorded execution.
The gure also shows that increasing or decreasing the checkpoint period
changes the speed. Interestingly, even without checkpointing, replay already
takes on average 48% longer that Rec.
To understand these eects, Figure 8.4(b) shows again the slowdown of
RepChk1 over Rec and breaks it down into its sources. The sources are those
during recording plus creating checkpoints (Chk). During recording, RAS
involved saving/restoring the RAS at context switches; now it additionally
includes saving (but not restoring) the RAS at VMExits.
The breakdown in the gure shows that creating checkpoints contributes
noticeably to the total overhead. This is why the frequency of checkpoints
matters. The actual overhead depends on the memory write characteristics
of the workload; poor memory locality causes more page copies, increasing
checkpointing overhead.
Interestingly, we see that interrupt overhead dominates. The reason is that
interrupts are asynchronous events, while rdtsc, pio/mmio, and network are
synchronous. Identifying the instruction that should get the asynchronous
interrupt injected during replay is time-consuming. As indicated in Sec-
tion 7.1, it requires single-stepping VMExits over several instructions. This
is the reason for the overhead of Figure 8.4(b). It also explains why replay-
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ing without checkpointing (RepNoChk) already has signicant overhead over
Rec.
8.3.2 Alarm Replay
Finally, Figure 8.5 compares the execution time of alarm replay (RepAlarm)
to previously shown environments: checkpointing replay (RepChk1) and record-
ing (Rec). The bars are normalized to Rec. Alarm replay needs to trap on
every call and return instruction. Hence, the slowdown of this mode directly
relates to how many kernel call and return instructions were executed. We
see that replaying make and mysql takes 30-40x longer than recording them.
For apache, it takes 50x. On the other hand, for radiosity, with its modest
kernel activity, it takes 2.8x.
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CHAPTER 9
RELATED WORK
Hardware-Software Approach. Our approach shares similarities with
Raksha [63]. Raksha raises security exceptions on potential security viola-
tions. A software exception handler investigates the threat. Our approach of
replaying the execution upon threat identication is more powerful. This is
because an exception handler is limited to inspecting a single system state|
whereas replay can inspect the steps leading to the exception. If the excep-
tion occurs after the attack, our replay approach is better suited to assess
the damage of the attack.
Targeting the RAS for Security. The behavior of call and return in-
structions has been targeted in the past to secure against buer overow at-
tacks [25,26,37,64]. Tuck et al. [36] explored using hardware to encrypt vari-
ables used to modify control ow, a technique proposed by PointGuard [37].
The proposal is for programs to ensure that control ow modifying variables
are stored encrypted and decrypted prior to being used. Assuming the at-
tacker cannot discover the secret key, the attacker will not be able to redirect
control ow even if the attacker can rewrite a control-ow variable. These
techniques are starting to be used today [35] in protecting against code reuse
attacks. SmashGuard [25,26] proposed using secured RASes that are backed
by memory which require non-trivial hardware changes.
Record and Deterministic Replay (RnR) for Security. The closest
previous work to ours is Aftersight [51]. It suggests using VM-level RnR to
perform online dynamic analysis of a system's execution. Although it lays out
the general direction for VM-level RnR for online analysis, Aftersight does
not address some important aspects of such a model. For example, unlike our
proposal, Aftersight assumes that the replay analysis is constantly running
and is able to catch up with (or only modestly slow down) the recording;
otherwise, it loses precision and might introduce false positives. This is not
a reasonable assumption in case of heavy-weight analysis such as our ROP
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detection algorithm. In contrast, RnR-ROPSafe advances the state of the art
by proposing a holistic architecture that captures many practical aspects of
RnR-based online security analysis. These key practical aspects are: (1) Co-
designed hardware-software mechanisms (e.g., the RAS extensions) to achieve
reasonable overhead while keeping hardware changes simple; (2) separate
checkpointing and alarm replayers; and (3) need-based triggering of analysis
replays (as opposed to constantly-running analysis).
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis we propose a departure from the traditional approach to build-
ing defenses against malware. The traditional approach is to monitor and/or
enforce the security properties inline with the execution. Complex security
properties such as control-ow or data-ow integrity require monitoring and
tracking common events|like memory access or branches. The price of in-
strumenting programs with the code to perform these checks and make these
measurements is too high. As such, modern systems do not preserve these
properties, despite their need to prevent modern malware. Our approach de-
couples the security checks from program and system execution via Record
and Replay. There are additional benets, which we have only alluded to in
this thesis.
First, since replays can be instrumented, the system gains the ability to
introspect prior executions. This can be used to assess damage from prior
intrusions or to discover new intrusions in cases where new malware is dis-
covered. One way this can be used is to verify the veracity of potentially
misplaced security alarms. Previously, it was unacceptable for a security
alarm to be incorrect, as it implied an innocuous program was halted. Being
perfect for all executions requires a detector just as accurate in its assess-
ment of corner case executions as it is for common case ones; otherwise, the
attacker will either escape detection by exploiting the detector's gap in cov-
erage or turn the detector against the very system it protects by exploiting
its inaccuracy. Unfortunately, being correct for all executions is expensive as
corner cases are often pathological in nature. Thus, verifying security alarms
after the fact with RnR is a welcome exibility that allows the detector to
narrow its focus on the common case executions.
Our approach allowed simple, non-intrusive, and inexpensive techniques
to be used to protect systems. RnR was utilized to lter false-positives and
compensate for detector shortcomings. With the RAS-based ROP detector,
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the rare cases were highly nested codes which caused RAS underow events.
Replay was used to reconstruct these relevant events and analyze them|in
a way which the detector could not|to corroborate or refute the alarms.
Thus, we were able to use the RAS|despite its imprecision|and RnR to
detect ROP attacks without signicant overheads. Future work can explore
the additional detectors and additional attack surfaces.
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